Invocation of Duress and Coercion Defense in Iranian and U.S. Criminal Law

Abstract

This article examines the defense of duress and coercion in criminal proceedings and compares its application within the legal systems of Iran and the United States through a descriptive, analytical, and comparative approach. Invocation of duress and coercion as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility faces specific challenges in both legal systems. In Iranian law, the burden of proof lies with the defendant, who must demonstrate that the criminal act was committed under pressure or threat. Conversely, in the U.S. legal system, the defendant is required to provide compelling evidence indicating the existence of duress or coercion. In terms of similarities, both systems emphasize the importance of the burden of proof, and the defendant must meet certain conditions for the defense to be accepted. However, there are significant differences. In Iran, the lack of a clear judicial precedent regarding the acceptance of duress and coercion as a defense, along with the influence of social factors on judicial decisions, may result in the rejection of the defense. In contrast, in the United States, the presence of a jury allows the defendant to be exempted from criminal liability if sufficient evidence is presented. The fundamental distinction between the duress defense in Iran and the United States lies in its legal conceptualization: in the U.S., duress is treated as an affirmative defense that is examined in court and, if proven, results in exemption from criminal liability. In Iran, however, duress is considered a ground for excluding criminal responsibility and may be directly assessed by the court. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has played a significant role in shaping the doctrine of duress, whereas Iranian judicial precedent in this area remains underdeveloped, and further clarification is anticipated.