Smart Constitutional Oversight of Laws and Regulations in the Context of Modern Governance
Keywords:
Smart Oversight, Constitutional Law, Laws and Regulations, Modern Governance, Artificial Intelligence, Regulatory Governance, Judicial Review, Algorithmic AccountabilityAbstract
This study aimed to identify and explain the constitutional foundations, intelligent mechanisms, accountability safeguards, institutional requirements, and implementation conditions necessary for developing smart oversight of laws and regulations within the framework of modern governance. This study employed an exploratory qualitative design. The study population consisted of experts in constitutional law, public law, administrative law, legislation and regulation, digital governance, artificial intelligence, and legal technologies working in Tehran. Using purposive sampling with maximum variation, 18 participants were selected based on relevant academic or professional expertise and at least five years of related experience. Data were collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews and continued until conceptual saturation was achieved. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using qualitative thematic content analysis through iterative coding, constant comparison, category development, and abstraction of overarching themes. Credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability were strengthened through member checking, systematic documentation of coding decisions, peer consultation, and continuous comparison between raw data and emerging themes. Analysis of the interviews yielded 126 focused codes, 33 subthemes, and five overarching themes. The findings indicated that smart constitutional oversight requires constitutional legitimacy and normative conformity, including constitutional supremacy, protection of fundamental rights, equality, legality, institutional competence, separation of powers, proportionality, and procedural fairness. Intelligent oversight was further characterized by semantic constitutional screening, automated detection of conflicts and obsolete regulations, rights-risk identification, and continuous regulatory monitoring. Participants emphasized that algorithmic outputs must remain explainable, traceable, contestable, and subject to mandatory human validation. Institutional interoperability, standardized legal metadata, multidisciplinary governance, explicit legal authorization, reliable data, cybersecurity, algorithmic auditing, professional training, and phased implementation were identified as essential conditions for effective implementation.
References
Akhtar, Z. (2023). Montesquieu’s Theory of the Separation of Powers, Legislative Flexibility and Judicial Restraint in an Unwritten Constitution. Amicus Curiae, 4(3), 552-577. https://doi.org/10.14296/ac.v4i3.5616
Azeem, H. M., & Sultan, M. S. (2023). Piercing the Veil of Ouster Clauses: Exploring Judicial Review's Reach and Impact. Current Trends in Law and Society, 3(1), 32-43. https://doi.org/10.52131/ctls.2023.0301.0013
Bernstein, D. E. (2021). “Administrative Constitutionalism”: Considering the Role of Agency Decision-Making in American Constitutional Development. Social Philosophy and Policy, 38(1), 109-129. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0265052521000248
Bersch, K., & Fukuyama, F. (2023). Defining Bureaucratic Autonomy. Annual Review of Political Science, 26(1), 213-232. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102914
Bodrova, I. I. (2023). State-Legal Framework for the Oversight of Local Self-Government in Ukraine in the Context of European Integration Processes. 4-16. https://doi.org/10.46299/isg.2023.mono.legal.3.1.1
Bwire, B., Akech, M., & Meroka-Mutua, A. (2022). Conceptual Framework for Assessing the Performance of Kenyan Courts Undertaking Judicial Review of Legislative Action. Strathmore Law Journal, 6(1), 107-133. https://doi.org/10.52907/slj.v6i1.158
Catalano, M. (2022). Implications of Court Curbing in the US States. https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2022-d9bqt
Chitunhu, K., & Saruchera, M. (2026). Legislative Constraints and Journalistic Agency: Navigating the Legal Framework for Reporting on Corruption in Zimbabwe. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 61(5), 4260-4276. https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096251409181
Costa, P. B. M., Christiane Teixeira Dos Santos, D., & Paulo Henrique de Almeida, R. (2026). Legislative Control of Rulemaking in a Dependent State: A Critical Typology From Brazil. Politics & Policy, 54(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70141
Craig, P. (2022). Written and Unwritten Constitutions: The Modality of Change. 263-288. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781839702709.014
Faiez, N. (2022). Judicial Oversight on Administrative Decisions in Afghanistan. Administrative and Environmental Law Review, 3(2), 129-144. https://doi.org/10.25041/aelr.v3i2.2775
Jones, G. J. (2026). The Limits of Executive Discretion in John Marshall’s Constitutionalism. Political Research Quarterly, 79(3), 868-881. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129261443534
Koncewicz, T. T. (2022). When Legal Fundamentalism Meets Political Justice: The Case of Poland. Israel Law Review, 55(3), 302-359. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0021223722000036
Krehbiel, J. (2020). Public Awareness and the Behavior of Unpopular Courts. British Journal of Political Science, 51(4), 1601-1619. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123419000723
Martenet, V. (2020). Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Statutes From a Comparative Perspective. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3667769
Pandit, P. (2022). Judicial Review and Its Distinction With Appeal. International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research, 04(04), 76-85. https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2022.v04i04.007
Pangalangan, R. C. (2022). Judicial Review at the Asian Development Bank Administrative Tribunal. Asian Journal of International Law, 12(2), 248-258. https://doi.org/10.1017/s2044251322000212
Pasculli, L., & Stanford, B. (2022). Form and Flexibility: The Normalisation of ‘Magnitsky Sanctions’ in the Face of the Rule of Law. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 15(1), 109-142. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-022-00178-6
Pérez, A. T. (2020). In Nobody's Name: A Checks and Balances Approach to International Judicial Independence. 45-70. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908661-45
Rose‐Ackerman, S. (2022). Democracy and Executive Power: Administrative Policymaking in Comparative Perspective. Revista De Derecho Público Teoría Y Método, 6, 155-182. https://doi.org/10.37417/rpd/vol_6_2022_978
Sigalet, G. (2025). Hamilton's Fear: Republican Judicial Review and the Separation of Complicit Powers. European Journal of Political Theory, 25(3), 344-366. https://doi.org/10.1177/14748851251314735
Sweet, A. S., & Ryan, C. (2020). Kant, Cosmopolitanism and Systems of Constitutional Justice in Europe and Beyond. Global Constitutionalism, 9(3), 562-580. https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381720000143
Tommasini, N., Riccetto, P. A., & Roznai, Y. (2021). When Backlashes and Overrides Do Not Scare: The Power to Review Constitutional Amendments and the Case of Brazil's Supreme Court. International Journal of Human Rights and Constitutional Studies, 8(1/2), 80. https://doi.org/10.1504/ijhrcs.2021.113760
Treanor, W. M. (2020). The Genius of Hamilton and the Birth of the Modern Theory of the Judiciary. 464-514. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316479865.015
Waldron, J. (2021). The Rule of Law and the Role of Courts. Global Constitutionalism, 10(1), 91-105. https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381720000283
Woods, L., McNamara, L., & Townend, J. (2021). Executive Accountability and National Security. Modern Law Review, 84(3), 553-580. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12624
Downloads
Publication Timeline
- Submitted
- Revised
- Accepted
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 Abolfazl Navaei , Khairollah Parvin (Author); Mehdi Shabannia Mansour
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
