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  <Article>
    <Journal>
      <PublisherName></PublisherName>
      <JournalTitle>Legal Studies in Digital Age</JournalTitle>
      <Issn></Issn>
      <Volume>4</Volume>
      <Issue>Serial Number 13</Issue>
      <PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
        <Year>2025</Year>
        <Month>12</Month>
        <Day>27</Day>
      </PubDate>
    </Journal>
    <ArticleTitle>Legal Safeguards for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Oversight of the Principle of Equity in Wealth Distribution: A Comparative Study of Iraq and Algeria</ArticleTitle>
    <VernacularTitle>Legal Safeguards for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Oversight of the Principle of Equity in Wealth Distribution: A Comparative Study of Iraq and Algeria</VernacularTitle>
    <FirstPage>1</FirstPage>
    <LastPage>20</LastPage>
    <Language>EN</Language>
    <AuthorList>
      <Author>
        <FirstName></FirstName>
        <LastName></LastName>
        <Affiliation></Affiliation>
      </Author>
      <Author>
        <FirstName></FirstName>
        <LastName></LastName>
        <Affiliation></Affiliation>
      </Author>
    </AuthorList>
    <PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
    <History>
      <PubDate PubStatus="received">
        <Year>2025</Year>
        <Month>07</Month>
        <Day>10</Day>
      </PubDate>
    </History>
    <Abstract>&lt;p&gt;This study examines the legal safeguards required to enhance the effectiveness of oversight over the principle of equity in wealth distribution in Iraq and Algeria. The study proceeds from the premise that constitutional recognition of public ownership of natural resources and social justice is insufficient unless supported by effective legal, judicial, parliamentary, administrative, and financial oversight mechanisms. Particular attention is given to the management and distribution of oil and gas revenues because natural-resource income represents a major component of public finance in both countries. Using a descriptive-analytical and comparative approach, the study analyzes the constitutional foundations of equitable wealth distribution, the institutional structures responsible for oversight, and the legal mechanisms governing transparency, accountability, public expenditure, constitutional review, and resource allocation. The findings indicate that Iraq and Algeria share a common constitutional objective of protecting public wealth and promoting distributive justice, but differ significantly in the institutional organization of oversight. Iraq's federal system creates a plural and decentralized oversight structure involving the federal government, regions, governorates, Parliament, and judicial institutions, which can enhance territorial participation but also produces jurisdictional overlap, fragmented accountability, and recurring disputes over resource management and revenue distribution. Algeria's unitary structure provides greater institutional centralization and administrative coherence, but its effectiveness depends on the independence of oversight bodies, transparency in public procurement and financial administration, and meaningful constitutional review of economic and financial measures. The study concludes that effective oversight in both countries requires clearer legislation, predictable revenue-sharing mechanisms, stronger parliamentary and judicial control, comprehensive financial disclosure, independent auditing, transparent public procurement, and stronger protection of intergenerational equity. These safeguards are essential for transforming constitutional commitments to equity into practical and sustainable distributive outcomes.&lt;/p&gt;</Abstract>
    <ObjectList>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">Legal safeguards; equitable wealth distribution; constitutional oversight; natural resources; public finance; distributive justice; Iraq; Algeria</Param>
      </Object>
    </ObjectList>
    <ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://www.jlsda.com/index.php/lsda/article/download/532/452</ArchiveCopySource>
  </Article>
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