Legal Studies in Digital Age 5 Serial Number 18 2026 11 01 Legal Regulation of Digital Markets and Online Platforms in Iran: The Role of the Competition Council and the Regulatory Authority in Preventing Monopoly Legal Regulation of Digital Markets and Online Platforms in Iran: The Role of the Competition Council and the Regulatory Authority in Preventing Monopoly 1 12 EN Journal Article 2026 01 01 <p>The rapid growth of digital platforms in Iran, despite creating extensive economic opportunities, has also intensified the risk of monopolistic concentration and the weakening of fair competition. Two key institutions, namely the Competition Council and the Communications Regulatory Authority, are responsible for controlling such monopolistic tendencies. However, the central question is the extent to which these institutions have succeeded in fulfilling this role and the challenges they face in doing so. This article was developed with the aim of critically analyzing the legal structure and performance of Iran’s regulatory institutions in confronting monopolization in digital markets and providing an analytical framework for policymakers. The present study adopts a descriptive-analytical approach and draws upon a comparative examination of the experiences of leading jurisdictions, including the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Australia, alongside an analysis of higher-level legal and regulatory documents, in order to investigate the capacities and shortcomings of Iran’s regulatory system. The findings indicate that the obstacles to regulation in Iran are not merely attributable to legal deficiencies or limited resources; rather, they stem from a paradigmatic crisis involving the application of traditional regulatory concepts and instruments—originally designed for industrial markets—to the novel realities of the digital economy, which is fundamentally data-driven and algorithmic. This epistemic mismatch, combined with institutional fragmentation, the incomplete independence of regulatory bodies, and the inability to monitor algorithmic power, has resulted in a “regulatory vacuum” that dominant platforms exploit to consolidate market power. Moving beyond the current situation requires a fundamental reconsideration of the philosophy of regulation and a transition toward an intelligent and participatory regulatory model. Such a model should recognize the internal logic of the platform economy while establishing synergistic and data-driven supervisory mechanisms capable of transforming platforms into accountable actors with respect to market competitiveness.</p> https://www.jlsda.com/index.php/lsda/article/download/399/481