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<ArticleSet>
  <Article>
    <Journal>
      <PublisherName></PublisherName>
      <JournalTitle>Legal Studies in Digital Age</JournalTitle>
      <Issn></Issn>
      <Volume>5</Volume>
      <Issue>Serial Number 16</Issue>
      <PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
        <Year>2026</Year>
        <Month>05</Month>
        <Day>01</Day>
      </PubDate>
    </Journal>
    <ArticleTitle>Comparative Evaluation of the Mental Elements of Crimes Arising from Artificial Intelligence in Imami Jurisprudence and International Criminal Law</ArticleTitle>
    <VernacularTitle>Comparative Evaluation of the Mental Elements of Crimes Arising from Artificial Intelligence in Imami Jurisprudence and International Criminal Law</VernacularTitle>
    <FirstPage>1</FirstPage>
    <LastPage>6</LastPage>
    <ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.61838/jpmbh.343</ELocationID>
    <Language>EN</Language>
    <AuthorList>
      <Author>
        <FirstName></FirstName>
        <LastName></LastName>
        <Affiliation></Affiliation>
      </Author>
    </AuthorList>
    <PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
    <History>
      <PubDate PubStatus="received">
        <Year>2025</Year>
        <Month>09</Month>
        <Day>02</Day>
      </PubDate>
    </History>
    <Abstract>&lt;p&gt;The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence has challenged the traditional concept of the “mental element of crime” within criminal justice systems. This study aims to conduct a comparative analysis of the mental elements of crimes arising from artificial intelligence within two frameworks: Imami jurisprudence and international criminal law. The research adopts a descriptive–analytical method with a comparative approach, and data have been collected through library research and documentary analysis. According to the findings, both systems currently regard artificial intelligence as lacking an independent mental element (intent, knowledge, or mens rea) as well as criminal capacity. In Imami jurisprudence, artificial intelligence is classified as an “object” or “property,” and liability is transferred to human agents (such as designers, manufacturers, and users) based on principles including liability for destruction (ḍamān al-itlāf), causation (tasbīb), and the no-harm rule (qāʿidat lā ḍarar). The focus of this system is on individual, duty-based moral responsibility. In contrast, international criminal law, drawing on its experience with organized crimes, has moved toward developing novel concepts such as command responsibility, risk-based liability, and the notion of electronic personality, in order to address the complexity and distributed nature of decision-making in the development of advanced artificial intelligence. The comparative conclusion indicates that Imami jurisprudence emphasizes the individual transfer of responsibility, whereas international criminal law adopts a functionalist perspective and moves toward mechanisms of collective and institutional responsibility. It is therefore recommended that the Iranian legal system, while preserving its jurisprudential foundations, draw on the capacities of both approaches to enact specific legislation and recognize “chain liability” and a “duty of care” for actors in the field of artificial intelligence.&lt;/p&gt;</Abstract>
    <ObjectList>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">Mental element of crime</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">artificial intelligence</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">Imami jurisprudence</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">international criminal law</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">criminal liability</Param>
      </Object>
    </ObjectList>
    <ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://www.jlsda.com/index.php/lsda/article/download/343/282</ArchiveCopySource>
  </Article>
</ArticleSet>
