Three-Decade Assessment of the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Mechanism and the Design of Strategic Pathways for Iran’s Full Accession

Abstract

The dispute settlement mechanism within the framework of the World Trade Organization constitutes the central binding adjudicatory system of the multilateral trading regime, established with the objective of ensuring security and predictability in trade relations among States. After three decades of operation, a fundamental question arises as to the extent to which this mechanism has succeeded in fulfilling its stated objectives, and the implications of the paralysis of the Appellate Body for its legitimacy and effectiveness. This article assesses the thirty-year performance of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism by examining its structural evolution, interpretative practices, and institutional challenges, with particular attention to the deadlock in the appointment of Appellate Body members and the role of the Secretariat in dispute adjudication. The study adopts a descriptive–analytical methodology based on library research, including constitutive agreements, panel and Appellate Body reports, official documents, and specialized literature in international trade law. The findings indicate that while the dispute settlement mechanism has played a significant role in the institutionalization of legal discipline in inter-State trade relations, asymmetries in enforcement capacity and disruptions in the appellate function have generated structural limitations. Accordingly, in light of the macro-level policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the effective and sovereignty-conscious utilization of this mechanism requires precise calibration of obligations, targeted legislative reform, and the formulation of a strategic framework aligned with national interests.