

Legal Safeguards for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Oversight of the Principle of Equity in Wealth Distribution: A Comparative Study of Iraq and Algeria

1. Ahmed Naeem Yasir Alfarhani : Ph.D. Student, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, Qom, Iran

2. Davoud Mohebbi *: Assistant Professor in Public Law, University of Qom, Qom, Iran

*Correspondence: D.mohebbi@qom.ac.ir

Abstract

This study examines the legal safeguards required to enhance the effectiveness of oversight over the principle of equity in wealth distribution in Iraq and Algeria. The study proceeds from the premise that constitutional recognition of public ownership of natural resources and social justice is insufficient unless supported by effective legal, judicial, parliamentary, administrative, and financial oversight mechanisms. Particular attention is given to the management and distribution of oil and gas revenues because natural-resource income represents a major component of public finance in both countries. Using a descriptive-analytical and comparative approach, the study analyzes the constitutional foundations of equitable wealth distribution, the institutional structures responsible for oversight, and the legal mechanisms governing transparency, accountability, public expenditure, constitutional review, and resource allocation. The findings indicate that Iraq and Algeria share a common constitutional objective of protecting public wealth and promoting distributive justice, but differ significantly in the institutional organization of oversight. Iraq's federal system creates a plural and decentralized oversight structure involving the federal government, regions, governorates, Parliament, and judicial institutions, which can enhance territorial participation but also produces jurisdictional overlap, fragmented accountability, and recurring disputes over resource management and revenue distribution. Algeria's unitary structure provides greater institutional centralization and administrative coherence, but its effectiveness depends on the independence of oversight bodies, transparency in public procurement and financial administration, and meaningful constitutional review of economic and financial measures. The study concludes that effective oversight in both countries requires clearer legislation, predictable revenue-sharing mechanisms, stronger parliamentary and judicial control, comprehensive financial disclosure, independent auditing, transparent public procurement, and stronger protection of intergenerational equity. These safeguards are essential for transforming constitutional commitments to equity into practical and sustainable distributive outcomes.

Keywords: Legal safeguards; equitable wealth distribution; constitutional oversight; natural resources; public finance; distributive justice; Iraq; Algeria

Received: 10 July 2025

Revised: 10 December 2025

Accepted: 17 December 2025

Published: 27 December 2025



Copyright: © 2025 by the authors. Published under the terms and conditions of Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) License.

Citation: Atri, R., Shafizadeh, H., & Soleimani, N. (2025). Legal Safeguards for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Oversight of the Principle of Equity in Wealth Distribution: A Comparative Study of Iraq and Algeria. *Legal Studies in Digital Age*, 4(4), 1-20.

1. Introduction

The principle of equity in wealth distribution occupies a central position in contemporary constitutional law because the legitimacy of public authority is increasingly assessed not merely by the formal existence of representative institutions, but also by the extent to which the state converts national resources into broadly shared social and economic benefits. Wealth distribution, particularly in states whose public finances depend substantially on revenues generated by natural resources, raises questions that transcend economic policy and directly implicate constitutional rights, governmental accountability, public finance, territorial balance, and the rule of law. In this context, distributive equity refers to a constitutional and legal commitment to prevent national wealth from becoming concentrated in the hands of particular political, territorial, or social groups and to ensure that public resources are used in a manner compatible with equality, social justice, balanced development, and the protection of the public interest. The constitutional dimension of this principle is particularly evident when natural resources are legally characterized as belonging to the people, because such a characterization transforms resource management from a matter of governmental discretion into a legal responsibility subject to institutional oversight. The relationship between constitutional norms and social justice is therefore fundamental: constitutional provisions do not merely recognize abstract aspirations but impose limits on public power and provide legal grounds for reviewing governmental conduct where public resources are managed inconsistently with equality and fairness. In the Iraqi context, social justice is closely linked with constitutional commitments concerning social security, health, and the conditions necessary for a dignified life, and these commitments provide an important normative framework for evaluating how public wealth is allocated among citizens and regions (Al-Numan, 2020). The broader constitutionalization of rights likewise means that freedoms, economic interests, and distributive claims acquire a legal status capable of constraining public authorities rather than remaining purely political expectations (Ahmed, 2024). This transformation is particularly significant in resource-rich states, where the availability of substantial public revenues may coexist with unequal development, weak public services, territorial disparities, or the concentration of fiscal benefits.

Iraq and Algeria provide particularly relevant cases for comparative analysis because both states possess significant hydrocarbon resources and both have developed constitutional frameworks that associate public resources with national ownership and state responsibility. Nevertheless, their constitutional structures differ substantially. Iraq operates under a federal constitutional order in which competencies are distributed among the federal government, regions, and governorates, thereby creating complex questions concerning authority over natural resources, revenue collection, expenditure, and intergovernmental transfers. The federal character of the Iraqi state affects not only resource management but also the structure of financial oversight, since responsibility is divided among several constitutional and administrative levels. The nature of federalism necessarily influences the allocation of financial powers, particularly when constitutionally protected regional or local competencies intersect with nationally owned resources (Omar, 2018). Iraqi scholarship has therefore emphasized that disputes concerning oil and gas cannot be separated from broader questions about the constitutional distribution of jurisdiction between the federal government and subnational entities (Abboud, 2007). The absence of an entirely settled legislative framework governing all dimensions of oil and gas management has further intensified this problem, because uncertainty concerning the respective powers of federal authorities, regions, and producing governorates may weaken the predictability and effectiveness of oversight. The legal position of governorates and regions in relation to oil and gas has consequently remained a central issue in debates over the implementation of constitutional federalism (Al-Tamimi, 2015). Algeria, by contrast, is organized as a unitary state in which constitutional and administrative oversight is structurally more centralized. This does not eliminate problems of unequal wealth distribution or deficiencies in financial accountability, but it means that the institutional pathways through which oversight is exercised differ from those operating in Iraq. The comparison between the two states is therefore analytically useful because it makes it possible to assess how different constitutional structures affect the effectiveness of legal guarantees designed to protect distributive equity.

The question of public ownership of natural resources is particularly important in Iraq. The constitutional recognition that oil and gas belong to the Iraqi people establishes a legal principle that transcends the issue of formal title. Public ownership implies that the management of natural resources must be oriented toward the collective interest and that resource revenues cannot lawfully be treated as the exclusive property of a governmental institution, a producing territory, or a politically

dominant group. The right of the Iraqi people to benefit from natural wealth has accordingly been examined as a constitutional entitlement that places limitations on the form and effects of oil exploitation arrangements (Al-Yasiri, 2023). More broadly, the right to natural resources entails an obligation to manage exhaustible assets in a manner that serves society rather than allowing the state to exercise unrestricted power over them (Al-Amidi, 2019). The constitutional concept of public ownership is therefore inseparable from oversight. Where resources legally belong to the population, institutional mechanisms are required to determine whether extraction, contracting, revenue collection, budget allocation, and expenditure actually serve the interests of the people. This relationship between ownership and oversight is further strengthened by the idea of intergenerational justice. Natural resources such as oil and gas are exhaustible, and their rapid conversion into current public expenditure may produce short-term political benefits while transferring costs to future generations. Constitutional guarantees concerning future generations therefore provide an additional justification for monitoring resource management, fiscal sustainability, public borrowing, and the establishment of mechanisms capable of preserving part of resource wealth for long-term development (Jawad, 2021). Equity in wealth distribution consequently has both an intragenerational dimension, concerned with fairness among current individuals and territories, and an intergenerational dimension, concerned with the rights of those who will inherit the consequences of present economic choices.

The effectiveness of distributive justice cannot, however, be assessed merely by examining the wording of constitutional provisions. Constitutional recognition may remain ineffective where legislation is incomplete, institutions lack independence, access to financial information is restricted, parliamentary scrutiny is weak, courts are unable or unwilling to review economic measures, or corruption distorts the allocation of public resources. Legal safeguards are therefore necessary to bridge the gap between constitutional principles and institutional practice. The concept of legal guarantees refers to the legal rules, principles, procedures, and institutions through which public authority is constrained and rights are protected. The functioning of administrative law itself is based on the subjection of public administration to rules that determine lawful conduct and provide remedies against the misuse of governmental power (Abdullah, 2007). More specific legal regulations likewise demonstrate that rights and financial entitlements become effective only when substantive norms are accompanied by procedures governing their implementation (Abdul Hamza, 2008). Within the field of public wealth management, these guarantees include constitutional supremacy, the rule of law, separation of powers, judicial and constitutional review, parliamentary control over public finance, transparency, administrative accountability, access to information, protection of public funds, and mechanisms for combating corruption. Their importance lies not simply in preventing unlawful conduct but in directing public resources toward constitutionally legitimate distributive objectives.

The principle of constitutional supremacy provides the legal foundation for this system of accountability. When the constitution is treated as the supreme legal norm, all legislative and executive measures concerning public revenue, resource exploitation, budget allocation, and expenditure must conform to constitutional standards. The development of constitutional law has reinforced the idea that constitutions are not limited to organizing governmental institutions but also provide substantive protection for rights, equality, public interests, and limits on governmental discretion (Al-Masawi, 2017). This approach is particularly important in economic matters because distributive decisions are often presented as political choices that should remain largely beyond judicial scrutiny. Although courts should not replace elected institutions in determining detailed economic policy, public authorities cannot invoke political discretion to justify measures that violate constitutional rules, disregard mandatory distribution criteria, or undermine equality. Constitutional review thus functions as a mechanism for distinguishing legitimate policy choices from constitutionally impermissible exercises of power. The form and scope of constitutional adjudication are affected by the nature of the political system, and the Iraqi experience illustrates how institutional design can influence the capacity of constitutional review to restrain the legislative and executive branches (Akla, 2023). The Federal Supreme Court consequently assumes particular importance in disputes involving the distribution of powers and resources within Iraq's federal structure.

Parliamentary control constitutes another essential component of effective oversight because the allocation of wealth ordinarily occurs through the general budget and related fiscal legislation. The budget is not merely an accounting document but the principal legal instrument through which the state determines priorities, distributes resources among sectors and territories, and converts national wealth into public expenditure. Legislative competence in financial matters therefore has a direct relationship with the principle of distributive justice (Ghailan, 2009). The legislator's role extends beyond authorizing

revenue and expenditure to scrutinizing the basis of allocations, monitoring budget implementation, and holding the executive accountable for deviations from approved financial policies (Karim, 2022). In federal systems, financial competencies are especially important because the distribution of fiscal authority among different levels of government may affect regional equality and the effectiveness of national redistribution (Ghailan, 2015). Where public funds are distributed through politically negotiated rather than objectively defined criteria, oversight may become fragmented and distributive outcomes may depend excessively on bargaining power. Effective legal safeguards should therefore ensure that revenue-sharing mechanisms are transparent, predictable, and subject to review.

The Algerian experience highlights additional dimensions of oversight, particularly transparency and institutional control. Transparency in public financial management allows oversight bodies, legislators, courts, civil society, and citizens to determine how resources are collected and spent. It is particularly important in public procurement, where secrecy, discretionary procedures, or inadequate disclosure can facilitate corruption and distort the allocation of state resources. Algerian legal scholarship has therefore treated transparency in public procurement as an essential safeguard for legality and the protection of public funds (Djellab & Maamri, 2021). Constitutional guarantees also require institutions capable of ensuring compliance with constitutional norms, because formal constitutional rules do not enforce themselves. The effectiveness of constitutional norms in Algeria depends on mechanisms such as separation of powers, institutional review, and procedures enabling constitutional bodies to address legislative or executive deviation (Belaaribi & Mouhou, 2017). The development of constitutional review, including review of legislative orders, further strengthens the capacity of the constitutional system to scrutinize the conformity of governmental action with superior legal norms (Ben Mehrou & Labiad, 2023). These mechanisms are relevant to wealth distribution because financial and economic measures remain exercises of public authority and must therefore comply with constitutional requirements.

The central problem addressed in this article is the gap between the constitutional recognition of distributive equity and public ownership of wealth, on the one hand, and the practical effectiveness of mechanisms supervising resource management and allocation, on the other. This problem manifests differently in Iraq and Algeria because of differences in constitutional structure, institutional organization, and the distribution of public powers. In Iraq, federalism creates opportunities for territorial participation but also generates jurisdictional overlap, disputes over resource management, and fragmentation of oversight. In Algeria, the unitary structure facilitates greater institutional centralization but may also concentrate decision-making and reduce the plurality of oversight channels. In both systems, however, legal safeguards can be effective only where constitutional principles are translated into precise legislative obligations, independent review, transparency, accountability, and enforceable procedures. Accordingly, the objective of this article is to examine the constitutional and legal safeguards capable of enhancing the effectiveness of oversight over equitable wealth distribution in Iraq and Algeria, compare their institutional strengths and weaknesses, and identify the reforms necessary to transform constitutional commitments to distributive justice into effective mechanisms for the management and allocation of national wealth.

2. Constitutional Foundations of Equity in Wealth Distribution in Iraq and Algeria

The constitutional foundation of equitable wealth distribution rests on the relationship between the ownership of national resources, the social functions of the state, equality among citizens, and the legal obligation of public authorities to manage resources in the public interest. Social justice in constitutional law is broader than the mere equal application of formal legal rules because it concerns the substantive capacity of individuals and groups to benefit from national economic resources, public services, and opportunities. Economic rights therefore form an important component of constitutional justice, especially where the state controls substantial public revenues derived from natural resources. Iraqi constitutional scholarship has associated economic rights with the broader constitutional responsibility to provide conditions enabling citizens to enjoy education, health, social security, and other elements of a dignified life (Ghailan, 2014). The principle of equitable wealth distribution should consequently be understood as a constitutional framework connecting public revenue with social obligations. The relevant question is not whether every individual receives an identical financial share, but whether national resources are allocated according to legally defensible criteria that protect equality, respond to social needs, promote balanced territorial development, and prevent arbitrary discrimination. Equity therefore permits differentiated allocations where objective differences in

population, deprivation, production burdens, environmental damage, or development needs justify them, while prohibiting distributions based on political favoritism, sectarian interests, territorial coercion, or corruption.

In Iraq, the constitutional treatment of oil and gas is particularly significant because hydrocarbon revenues constitute the principal foundation of public finance. The constitutional declaration that oil and gas are owned by the Iraqi people establishes collective ownership and rejects the notion that natural wealth belongs solely to the central government or the territory in which it is geographically located. This constitutional principle supports an understanding of resource revenues as national resources to be managed on behalf of the population as a whole. Scholarship concerning the right to natural resources has emphasized that public ownership restricts the state's freedom to exploit natural assets exclusively for short-term or institutional interests (Al-Amidi, 2019). Likewise, examination of Iraqi oil contracts has emphasized that public ownership requires contractual and administrative arrangements to remain compatible with the people's right to derive benefits from their natural wealth (Al-Yasiri, 2023). This approach has important distributive consequences because it establishes an obligation to prevent producing territories, central institutions, private contractors, or politically influential actors from appropriating disproportionate benefits at the expense of the population. At the same time, public ownership does not necessarily require uniform territorial distribution. The constitutional framework recognizes that revenue allocation must take account of demographic distribution and the conditions of affected territories, thereby incorporating both equality and corrective distributive considerations.

The Iraqi constitutional provisions concerning the management of oil and gas also reveal the complex relationship between national ownership and federalism. Federal systems necessarily distribute authority among different levels of government, and this distribution affects the administration of resources, taxation, expenditure, and transfers. Comparative analysis of federal structures demonstrates that the allocation of governmental powers is a defining feature of federalism and that conflicts may arise where constitutional language does not clearly assign particular functions (Omar, 2018). In Iraq, this difficulty is acute in the oil and gas sector because constitutional provisions simultaneously recognize national ownership and provide roles for the federal government, regions, and producing governorates. The constitutional competencies concerning oil and gas have consequently been the subject of extensive legal analysis (Hussein, 2015). The division of jurisdiction in the investment and management of hydrocarbons similarly illustrates the possibility of overlapping interpretations concerning federal and regional authority (Abboud, 2007). These ambiguities affect distributive justice because uncertainty concerning who may extract, contract, collect, deposit, and distribute revenues can weaken unified financial accountability. Where competencies are disputed, each institution may claim constitutional authority while denying responsibility for distributive outcomes.

The position of regions and governorates not organized into a region further illustrates the need for precise legal regulation. The federal system grants subnational entities important constitutional status, but that status must be reconciled with the national ownership of oil and gas. Analysis of the powers of regions and governorates concerning hydrocarbons demonstrates that unresolved questions remain concerning the scope of local authority and the relationship between regional interests and national resource policy (Al-Tamimi, 2015). These questions have practical consequences when oil revenues are negotiated, deposited, withheld, or distributed through intergovernmental mechanisms. Equity requires that resource allocation be based on transparent constitutional and legislative criteria rather than recurring political bargaining. The absence of comprehensive implementing legislation increases the risk that disputes over competence will become disputes over revenue. Such disputes undermine oversight by fragmenting financial information and creating uncertainty as to which institution bears legal responsibility for particular decisions. A central safeguard in Iraq is therefore the creation of an integrated statutory framework capable of translating constitutional resource provisions into detailed rules concerning production, contracting, revenue collection, auditing, transfer, distribution, and publication of financial information.

The constitutional supremacy of the Iraqi Constitution strengthens these distributive commitments by requiring all public authorities and subnational legal orders to conform to the national constitution. Constitutional supremacy is particularly important where resource disputes intersect with federalism because it provides a common legal standard against which federal legislation, regional measures, contracts, regulations, and administrative decisions may be assessed. The general theory of constitutional law treats constitutional supremacy as a necessary condition for limiting public power and protecting the legal hierarchy of the state (Al-Masawi, 2017). Within Iraq, the challenge is not merely to proclaim constitutional supremacy but to ensure that disputes concerning resource management can be effectively resolved through constitutional adjudication. The structure of the political system influences the practical operation of constitutional review, particularly in politically sensitive

disputes involving the balance of powers (Akla, 2023). The Federal Supreme Court therefore performs a crucial function because disagreements concerning natural resources, public revenues, and intergovernmental authority may threaten both fiscal stability and constitutional coherence. Judicial review provides a legal mechanism capable of determining whether resource-related legislation or governmental measures remain within constitutional limits.

The principle of the rule of law reinforces this framework by requiring public officials and institutions to act under legally defined powers. The constitutionalization of freedoms and rights is meaningful only where governmental authority is subject to enforceable legal constraints (Ahmed, 2024). In the context of wealth distribution, the rule of law requires revenue collection and expenditure to occur through authorized procedures, prevents officials from treating public wealth as discretionary political resources, and ensures that citizens and territories are protected against arbitrary exclusion. The principle is particularly significant in rentier economies because the state may possess substantial financial resources without relying heavily on direct taxation, potentially weakening traditional fiscal accountability between government and society. Oil wealth has historically been associated with the strengthening of governmental authority where revenues are controlled by the state without sufficiently transparent mechanisms of social accountability (Al-Hiti, 2007). A constitutional approach to equitable distribution therefore requires that resource wealth be brought within the same legal framework of authorization, review, audit, and responsibility applicable to other public funds.

The social dimension of the Iraqi constitutional order provides further support for distributive equity. Constitutional commitments regarding social security, health, and dignified living conditions establish substantive objectives that cannot be achieved without the allocation of sufficient public resources. The Iraqi constitutional conception of social justice has consequently been linked to the state's responsibility to address social deprivation and provide basic services (Al-Numan, 2020). This connection is important because wealth distribution should not be reduced to transfers between governmental units. Revenue distribution ultimately concerns the capacity of public institutions to convert national wealth into improvements in citizens' welfare. A governorate may receive a nominally equitable fiscal allocation while residents remain deprived if funds are lost through corruption, inefficient procurement, patronage, or ineffective administration. The constitutional principle of equity therefore requires oversight not only of the initial allocation of revenues but also of final expenditure and outcomes.

The rights of future generations introduce a temporal dimension into constitutional wealth distribution. Oil and gas are nonrenewable resources; once extracted, they cannot be restored. A state that distributes all resource revenues through current consumption may produce apparent short-term equality while depriving future citizens of the economic value of resources constitutionally owned by the people. Constitutional protection of future generations consequently supports fiscal mechanisms that preserve or invest part of resource revenues (Jawad, 2021). Sovereign wealth funds, stabilization funds, long-term investment strategies, and restrictions on unsustainable borrowing may therefore be viewed not simply as economic policy instruments but as mechanisms of intergenerational distributive justice. The Norwegian experience has frequently been invoked in Iraqi discussions because it demonstrates how petroleum revenues may be invested in ways that preserve wealth beyond the period of extraction. Although institutional models cannot be transplanted mechanically, the broader principle remains relevant: legal safeguards should prevent current governments from exhausting public assets for immediate political gain.

Public expenditure is another constitutional dimension of wealth distribution because the state's distributive choices are ultimately expressed through spending. Public expenditure has legal components and must be authorized, categorized, and subject to financial controls (Abdul Qadir, 2018). Parliament's legislative competence in financial affairs therefore provides an important constitutional safeguard against executive monopoly over distribution (Ghailan, 2009). The general budget determines how national resources are transformed into infrastructure, salaries, health services, social protection, education, public investment, and transfers to subnational units. The legislator's role in the budget process includes authorization and scrutiny, making parliamentary control essential for evaluating whether resource allocation complies with constitutional priorities (Karim, 2022). At the federal level, the complexity of financial competencies intensifies the need for transparent rules concerning revenue sharing and transfers (Ghailan, 2015). Without such rules, distributive justice may become dependent on annual political negotiation, reducing predictability and enabling strategic withholding of resources.

In Algeria, the constitutional foundations of distributive equity operate within a more centralized institutional structure. The unitary nature of the state allows national institutions to exercise greater direct control over public revenues and economic

policy. This centralization can facilitate unified standards for resource management, budgeting, and oversight, but it also creates a corresponding need for strong accountability because concentrated decision-making may reduce the number of institutional actors capable of challenging distributive decisions. Algerian constitutional guarantees are therefore important in ensuring that the centralization of authority does not become the centralization of unchecked discretion. Legal guarantees for implementing constitutional rules include institutional and procedural arrangements that ensure public authorities remain bound by constitutional objectives (Belaaribi & Mouhou, 2017). The constitutionalization of social and economic principles becomes effective only where legislation, courts, and oversight bodies can require governmental compliance.

Distributive justice in Algeria is also connected with broader mechanisms for redistributing public resources and ensuring that funds reach their intended beneficiaries. Research on distributive justice within Algerian institutions demonstrates that equity depends not merely on the volume of resources collected but also on transparent criteria, oversight procedures, and accountability in disbursement (Brahimi & Zenkri, 2024). This principle is directly applicable to the management of national wealth. Central authorities may possess substantial fiscal resources, yet the existence of resources does not automatically ensure equitable outcomes. Effective distribution requires objective eligibility criteria, reliable data, procedural transparency, and mechanisms through which decisions may be reviewed. These requirements support a constitutional conception of equity based on institutionalized fairness rather than discretionary generosity.

Transparency is particularly important in the Algerian constitutional context because public procurement and expenditure constitute major channels through which national wealth is transformed into public benefits. Legal guarantees of transparency in public procurement enhance competition, reduce opportunities for favoritism, and allow financial decisions to be scrutinized (Djellab & Maamri, 2021). Procurement rules therefore perform a distributive function. When procurement is corrupt or opaque, public wealth may be transferred to privileged economic actors rather than used to improve public services or infrastructure. Conversely, transparent procedures help ensure that the value of public expenditure is preserved. Constitutional review complements these safeguards by ensuring that legislative measures remain consistent with superior constitutional requirements. The development of constitutional review over legislative orders in Algeria illustrates the importance of examining executive-influenced legislation against constitutional standards (Ben Mehrou & Labiad, 2023). This function assumes particular importance in financial and economic matters, where urgent or executive-centered legislation may otherwise escape meaningful scrutiny.

The comparison of Iraq and Algeria therefore reveals that constitutional foundations are necessary but insufficient conditions for equitable wealth distribution. Iraq possesses a federal constitutional framework that recognizes national ownership of oil and gas while distributing competencies among multiple levels of government. Algeria possesses a more centralized framework in which national institutions exercise greater control over fiscal and economic policy. Neither structure inherently guarantees superior distributive justice. Federalism can promote territorial participation but may produce fragmented responsibility; centralization can facilitate coherent policy but may concentrate discretion. The decisive issue is whether each constitutional system contains effective legal mechanisms for converting abstract principles of public ownership, equality, and social justice into transparent and reviewable decisions concerning resource management and public expenditure. This requires not only clear constitutional provisions but also statutory implementation, institutional independence, access to information, financial accountability, judicial review, and consistent enforcement.

3. Legal and Institutional Safeguards for Effective Oversight

Effective oversight of equitable wealth distribution depends on a combination of constitutional, legislative, judicial, parliamentary, administrative, and financial safeguards. No single institution can ensure distributive justice because the management of public wealth involves multiple stages, including resource extraction, contracting, revenue collection, budgeting, allocation, expenditure, auditing, and evaluation. Oversight must therefore operate throughout the entire financial cycle. The first safeguard is constitutional supremacy, which requires all public institutions to exercise their financial and economic powers within the boundaries established by the constitution. Constitutional law provides the superior normative framework through which governmental powers are organized and limited (Al-Masawi, 2017). In practical terms, constitutional supremacy means that laws regulating hydrocarbons, public budgets, regional transfers, taxation, procurement, and public expenditure may not contradict constitutional principles concerning equality, public ownership, or the distribution

of powers. It also means that executive decisions cannot circumvent constitutional requirements through administrative discretion. This principle is particularly important in Iraq, where conflicts concerning natural-resource competencies may arise between the federal government and subnational authorities, and in Algeria, where centralized decision-making must remain subject to constitutional limitations.

The rule of law transforms constitutional supremacy into an operational principle by requiring every decision affecting public wealth to possess a lawful basis. Public administration derives its authority from law, and administrative action must remain within the competences and procedures established by legal rules ([Abdullah, 2007](#)). Consequently, ministries, public enterprises, regional authorities, procurement agencies, and other institutions involved in managing public funds must be able to identify the legal authority under which they act. The rule of law also requires decisions to be susceptible to review. A system in which public bodies may allocate resources without giving reasons, publishing criteria, or facing legal consequences for deviation cannot provide effective distributive oversight. The constitutionalization of public freedoms and rights further reinforces the principle that governmental authority cannot remain beyond legal control ([Ahmed, 2024](#)). In wealth distribution, this implies that government cannot justify arbitrary differences in allocation merely by invoking economic policy.

Separation of powers constitutes a second fundamental safeguard. Its importance lies not in rigidly isolating governmental branches but in ensuring that the authority to collect, allocate, spend, and review public resources is not concentrated in a single institution. Legislative authorization of expenditure, executive implementation of the budget, judicial review of legality, and independent financial auditing create a structure of mutual control. Constitutional guarantees of rights have historically been associated with institutional arrangements that prevent the concentration and abuse of public power ([Khalil, 2008](#)). Applied to distributive justice, the separation of powers ensures that the executive cannot unilaterally determine how national wealth is distributed without parliamentary authorization or legal scrutiny. This is especially important in rentier states because large natural-resource revenues can strengthen executive authority if the government controls revenue independently of meaningful legislative or societal oversight.

Parliamentary oversight is therefore indispensable. Parliament's role in financial affairs includes adopting the budget, scrutinizing revenue forecasts, questioning ministers, examining public expenditure, and reviewing government compliance with appropriations. Legislative competence in financial matters is an essential component of democratic fiscal control ([Ghailan, 2009](#)). The general budget is the most direct legal expression of distributive priorities, and the legislature's participation in its preparation and approval provides a mechanism for debating whether allocations reflect population, regional needs, social vulnerabilities, infrastructure deficits, and development objectives. The legislator's role should not end when the budget is enacted; effective oversight requires continuous monitoring of implementation and examination of deviations ([Karim, 2022](#)). Where budget execution differs substantially from approved appropriations, distributive equity may be undermined even if the formal budget appears balanced.

In Iraq, parliamentary oversight is complicated by the federal distribution of financial powers. Financial competencies in federal systems require coordination between levels of government and clear rules concerning revenue sources, transfers, and expenditure responsibilities ([Ghailan, 2015](#)). When these rules are ambiguous, parliamentary oversight may become politically fragmented. Federal legislators may focus on national fiscal policy while regional institutions assert separate authority over resource revenues or expenditures. The constitutional allocation of oil and gas competencies has therefore become central to Iraqi debates concerning resource governance ([Hussein, 2015](#)). The conflict of jurisdiction among federal, regional, and governorate authorities similarly demonstrates how institutional fragmentation may impede accountability ([Abboud, 2007](#)). If several institutions claim authority over the same financial resources, each may attribute failures to another body. Effective oversight thus requires precise legal identification of responsibility at every stage of resource management.

The absence of comprehensive and settled legislation governing the oil and gas sector represents a particularly significant weakness in Iraq. Constitutional provisions establish important principles, but these principles require detailed statutory implementation. The jurisdiction of regions and governorates regarding hydrocarbons cannot be effectively supervised where the legal boundaries of their powers remain disputed ([Al-Tamimi, 2015](#)). The failure to establish a fully integrated legal framework creates uncertainty concerning contracting authority, revenue management, data disclosure, and the institutional channels through which disputes should be resolved. Such uncertainty is incompatible with effective oversight because review

bodies cannot consistently determine compliance when substantive duties are not clearly defined. Enactment of comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation should therefore be regarded as a legal safeguard rather than merely an economic reform.

Constitutional adjudication provides another indispensable safeguard. Courts exercising constitutional jurisdiction ensure that legislation and governmental measures remain consistent with the constitution. The economic role of constitutional judges includes reviewing financial legislation and governmental measures that may affect equality, public funds, and constitutional economic principles (Salman & Ibrahim, 2022). Constitutional adjudication is particularly important because financial and economic policies can have profound effects on rights even where they are formally presented as technical measures. A rule allocating resource revenues disproportionately, excluding particular territories without objective justification, or allowing public wealth to be transferred without lawful authority may raise constitutional issues even if it is adopted through ordinary political procedures. Constitutional courts therefore provide a forum in which distributive measures can be tested against superior norms.

In Iraq, the Federal Supreme Court plays a central role in preserving constitutional boundaries. Judicial review of unconstitutional amendments and measures demonstrates the broader protective function of constitutional adjudication in safeguarding fundamental constitutional principles (Kadhim, 2023). The judiciary's protection of rights and freedoms similarly establishes a basis for reviewing public action that undermines constitutional legal positions (Habib, 2012). The importance of this function is magnified by federalism because resource disputes may simultaneously involve questions of institutional competence, public ownership, fiscal distribution, and constitutional equality. The effectiveness of judicial oversight, however, depends on independence, accessibility, enforceability of judgments, and clarity of constitutional doctrine. A formally powerful constitutional court cannot protect distributive justice if politically sensitive resource cases are delayed, judgments are not implemented, or institutional conflicts prevent enforcement.

The nature of the political system also affects judicial review. Constitutional review does not operate in isolation from broader institutional arrangements, and its practical effectiveness depends on the relationship among constitutional bodies (Akla, 2023). Constitutional adjudication may be weakened where appointment procedures expose judges to political influence or where jurisdictional uncertainty limits access to review. Conversely, a strong constitutional court can help stabilize the distribution of powers and create predictable principles concerning public finance. The role of constitutional adjudication in correcting or influencing legislation is therefore central to ensuring that the political branches remain within constitutional boundaries (Laibi, 2023). In wealth distribution, judicial independence should be understood as an institutional condition for impartial review of fiscal and resource decisions involving powerful political interests.

Algeria's constitutional review system performs a similar function within a unitary structure. Legal guarantees for implementing constitutional rules require mechanisms capable of preventing legislation and executive measures from diverging from constitutional requirements (Belaaribi & Mouhou, 2017). The review of legislative orders is particularly important because such instruments may allow the executive to influence lawmaking in circumstances where ordinary parliamentary scrutiny is reduced. Algerian constitutional scholarship concerning legislative orders demonstrates the importance of subjecting these measures to constitutional review (Ben Mehrou & Labiad, 2023). In the context of wealth distribution, this ensures that economic or financial measures adopted through exceptional legislative forms remain subject to constitutional standards concerning legality and rights.

Transparency constitutes another essential safeguard because meaningful oversight is impossible without reliable information. Public institutions cannot be held accountable for resource collection, allocation, or expenditure if financial data are incomplete, delayed, inaccessible, or inconsistent. Transparency should therefore extend to petroleum contracts, production volumes, revenue receipts, transfers, public procurement, budget execution, government borrowing, and the financial operations of state-owned enterprises. In Algeria, transparency in public procurement has been treated as a legal principle necessary for protecting public funds and ensuring integrity in government contracting (Djellab & Maamri, 2021). Procurement is a particularly important area because large portions of public wealth are converted into infrastructure and services through contracts with private entities. Transparent tendering, publication of criteria, disclosure of awarded contracts, conflict-of-interest rules, and accessible review procedures reduce the opportunities for public resources to be diverted toward favored actors.

Transparency also facilitates social oversight. Citizens, civil society organizations, researchers, journalists, and professional bodies can contribute to accountability only when public information is available in usable form. Distributive justice therefore benefits from open budgeting, accessible regional allocation data, and publication of audit findings. Transparency should not be understood as passive publication of large quantities of technical information. Effective disclosure requires clarity, timeliness, comparability, and sufficient detail to allow the public to identify how revenues are distributed and whether announced allocations are actually spent. The same principle applies to institutions responsible for redistributive mechanisms. Algerian research concerning distributive justice has emphasized that fairness depends on oversight procedures and the availability of information concerning resource collection and disbursement (Brahimi & Zenkri, 2024). This insight can be extended to national wealth management generally.

Protection against corruption forms an inseparable part of oversight. Corruption undermines equitable distribution by redirecting public resources from constitutionally legitimate objectives toward private or political interests. Legal safeguards should therefore include criminal prohibitions, asset disclosure, conflict-of-interest rules, independent investigation, transparent procurement, and protection for persons reporting wrongdoing. Although the approved sources focus more heavily on constitutional and financial mechanisms than on the full architecture of anti-corruption law, the principle of transparency established in Algerian public procurement provides an important preventive foundation (Djellab & Maamri, 2021). Effective oversight requires not only mechanisms for detecting unlawful conduct after it occurs but institutional structures designed to reduce opportunities for corruption before resources are lost.

Protection of public property and the people's right to national wealth also justify rigorous scrutiny of resource contracts. Constitutional protection of property illustrates the importance attached to legally recognized ownership and safeguards against unlawful interference (Al-Sarraf, 2010). When applied by analogy to nationally owned resources, the principle supports the view that public authorities must not dispose of collective wealth in ways that defeat constitutional ownership. Iraqi research concerning oil contracts emphasizes that foreign investment arrangements must remain compatible with the people's right to exploit and benefit from national resources (Al-Yasiri, 2023). Contractual oversight should therefore include legislative standards, financial disclosure, competitive procedures, audit rights, environmental obligations, revenue verification, and legal accountability for contractual terms that disproportionately transfer benefits away from the public.

Fiscal discipline and expenditure control are equally important. Equitable wealth distribution is not achieved if revenues are allocated formally but then dissipated through inefficient or unnecessary expenditure. Public expenditure must be legally authorized and directed toward legitimate public purposes (Abdul Qadir, 2018). Parliamentary financial oversight can help identify waste, but administrative auditing and performance evaluation are also required to determine whether expenditures produce the intended social and economic benefits. This is especially significant in resource-dependent economies, where temporary increases in oil prices may encourage unsustainable expansion of government spending. A legal framework that requires medium-term fiscal planning, transparent borrowing, expenditure ceilings, and reserve mechanisms can help protect public wealth from short-term political pressures.

Intergenerational safeguards should complement current fiscal controls. Constitutional protection of future generations supports the establishment of mechanisms ensuring that exhaustible resource wealth is not entirely consumed by present governments (Jawad, 2021). Sovereign wealth funds or similar long-term savings mechanisms may serve this purpose where their governance is transparent and legally protected. Such funds should themselves be subject to strong oversight because off-budget investment vehicles can create new opportunities for opacity. Clear rules should define deposits, withdrawals, investment strategies, reporting obligations, independent auditing, and parliamentary scrutiny. The Iraqi experience with oil wealth underscores the importance of preventing natural-resource revenues from reinforcing authoritarian or patronage-based structures (Al-Hiti, 2007). Converting resource wealth into long-term public assets can reduce this danger when combined with accountable governance.

Legal safeguards are therefore effective only when they function as an integrated system. Constitutional supremacy provides the normative framework; legislation translates constitutional principles into detailed duties; parliament authorizes and supervises financial decisions; the executive implements lawful policies; courts review constitutionality and legality; audit and oversight institutions verify compliance; transparency enables public scrutiny; and anti-corruption mechanisms address private diversion of public resources. Weakness in any one component can compromise the entire structure. Effective oversight of

distributive equity must consequently be continuous, coordinated, and institutionally independent rather than episodic or purely formal.

4. Comparative Evaluation of Oversight Effectiveness in Iraq and Algeria

A comparative evaluation of Iraq and Algeria demonstrates that the effectiveness of oversight is shaped not merely by the existence of constitutional safeguards but by the broader constitutional architecture within which those safeguards operate. Iraq's federal structure produces a plural system of authority in which multiple institutions possess roles in natural-resource management, financial allocation, and oversight. Algeria's unitary structure, by contrast, concentrates greater authority within national institutions and permits more centralized coordination. These differences affect the risks faced by each system. Iraq's principal challenge is institutional fragmentation and conflict of competence, whereas Algeria's principal challenge is ensuring sufficient accountability within a more centralized administrative and constitutional framework. Neither model is inherently superior. The central comparative question is whether the institutional structure facilitates clear responsibility, legal review, transparent information, and effective remedies when distributive standards are violated.

In Iraq, the constitutional distribution of authority over oil and gas lies at the center of the oversight problem. The federal character of the state requires power sharing between national and subnational institutions, yet the constitutional provisions governing resource management have generated conflicting interpretations. Analysis of constitutional oil and gas jurisdictions demonstrates that uncertainty concerning the boundaries of authority has remained a persistent problem (Hussein, 2015). Similarly, the distribution and conflict of jurisdiction among the federal government, regions, and governorates reveal the difficulties of coordinating natural-resource governance within the Iraqi federal system (Abboud, 2007). These disputes are not merely theoretical. They affect who negotiates contracts, who receives revenues, how revenues are deposited, which institutions can audit transactions, and how financial transfers are calculated. The jurisdiction of regions and non-regional governorates further complicates this structure because subnational entities possess distinct constitutional interests in natural-resource governance (Al-Tamimi, 2015).

Federalism nevertheless has potential advantages for distributive justice. Decentralized institutions may be more responsive to local conditions and can provide territories with a meaningful role in decisions affecting resources extracted from their areas. Producing regions may bear environmental, infrastructure, or social costs that justify differentiated fiscal treatment. Federalism can therefore support equity where national ownership is balanced with recognition of local needs. Comparative analysis of federal systems demonstrates that their defining characteristic is the constitutional allocation of governmental powers among distinct levels of authority (Omar, 2018). The problem arises when these allocations remain ambiguous or when intergovernmental cooperation is replaced by political conflict. Equity requires neither absolute centralization nor unlimited regional control but clear legal rules specifying how national and territorial interests should be reconciled.

Iraq's oversight structure must therefore address the problem of dispersed accountability. Where federal and regional institutions each control different elements of resource management, transparency must operate across institutional boundaries. Uniform reporting standards are necessary so that revenues received by different authorities can be compared and audited. A national framework should identify all sources of hydrocarbon revenue, the legal basis of each receipt, the accounts into which funds are deposited, the formula governing distribution, and the institutions responsible for expenditure. Without consolidated fiscal information, Parliament, courts, audit bodies, and citizens cannot determine whether the constitutional principle of national ownership is being realized in practice. The principle that natural resources belong to the people implies that institutional fragmentation cannot justify informational fragmentation (Al-Amidi, 2019).

The constitutional status of the people's resource rights provides an important benchmark for resolving these disputes. Iraqi scholarship has emphasized that exploitation arrangements must preserve the population's right to benefit from natural wealth (Al-Yasiri, 2023). This suggests that conflicts concerning federal or regional authority should not be evaluated solely as institutional power struggles. The ultimate constitutional criterion should be whether the disputed arrangement protects national ownership, equitable distribution, development, and the rights of affected territories. Similarly, constitutional guarantees for future generations require that federal and regional competition not lead to accelerated depletion or unsustainable fiscal

commitments (Jawad, 2021). The interests of current governmental institutions are therefore constitutionally subordinate to broader public and intergenerational interests.

Judicial oversight can help resolve these disputes, but its effectiveness depends on institutional legitimacy and compliance. The Federal Supreme Court has a particularly demanding role because its decisions may influence politically sensitive relations between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region or other territorial authorities. Constitutional review in Iraq is affected by the character of the political system and the broader institutional environment in which the Court operates (Akla, 2023). Judicial protection of constitutional principles requires not only jurisdiction but also independence and effective implementation. The Court's role in reviewing unconstitutional amendments illustrates the importance of constitutional adjudication as a safeguard against political alteration of fundamental constitutional arrangements (Kadhim, 2023). Likewise, judicial protection of rights demonstrates that constitutional courts can restrain governmental actions that conflict with constitutionally protected interests (Habib, 2012). In the context of wealth distribution, however, judicial effectiveness would be strengthened by clearer legislation that reduces the need for courts to resolve broad policy disputes through interpretation alone.

Iraq's parliamentary oversight also operates within this politically fragmented environment. Parliament possesses important financial functions, including legislative competence over public finance (Ghailan, 2009), and its role in the budget process gives it direct influence over the allocation of national resources (Karim, 2022). Yet annual budget politics may also become a forum for bargaining over territorial and sectoral allocations. This creates a risk that distributive equity is defined by political negotiation rather than stable legal standards. The federal distribution of financial powers makes it particularly important to distinguish constitutionally protected subnational interests from discretionary political concessions (Ghailan, 2015). A stronger system would combine parliamentary flexibility with statutory distribution formulas based on objective criteria such as population, developmental need, resource-production burdens, and regional disparities.

Algeria's centralized institutional system reduces some of these jurisdictional problems. National authorities exercise greater control over public financial policy, and the constitutional oversight system is not required to resolve the same degree of federal-regional conflict. This structural coherence can improve consistency in budgeting, auditing, and financial reporting. However, centralization creates its own risks. Where authority is concentrated, weak institutional independence may allow executive preferences to dominate resource allocation without sufficient countervailing control. Legal guarantees for the implementation of constitutional norms are therefore essential to ensure that centralized authority remains constitutionally constrained (Belaaribi & Mouhou, 2017). The effectiveness of Algeria's system depends on whether constitutional institutions, courts, parliament, and administrative oversight bodies possess genuine capacity to review governmental decisions rather than merely formal jurisdiction.

The development of constitutional review in Algeria is significant in this regard. Review of legislative orders is particularly important because such instruments can expand executive influence over legislation (Ben Mehrou & Labiad, 2023). Financial and economic policies adopted through executive-centered mechanisms should remain subject to constitutional scrutiny, especially where they affect public property, expenditure, or economic rights. Constitutional review thus compensates, at least partly, for the institutional concentration associated with a unitary state. The effectiveness of this safeguard depends on access to constitutional review, the scope of judicial reasoning, and the implementation of constitutional decisions.

Transparency is another area in which the Algerian system offers important comparative lessons. Public procurement constitutes a major field of expenditure and an important point of vulnerability for public wealth. Legal guarantees of transparency in Algerian procurement emphasize disclosure, objectivity, and procedures designed to reduce misuse of public funds (Djellab & Maamri, 2021). These safeguards are directly relevant to distributive justice because public procurement determines how fiscal resources are converted into infrastructure, services, and economic opportunities. A region may receive significant public investment in formal budget terms but derive limited social benefit if procurement is distorted by corruption or inefficiency. Transparency therefore protects both financial integrity and distributive outcomes.

The Algerian experience with institutionalized redistribution also underscores the importance of procedural fairness. Research concerning distributive justice in the operation of redistributive institutions demonstrates that the collection and allocation of funds must be accompanied by clear procedures, oversight, and disclosure (Brahimi & Zenkri, 2024). At the

national level, the same logic requires objective criteria for territorial and social allocation. Centralization can facilitate consistent standards, but it must not become a substitute for transparent justification. Citizens and territories should be able to understand why resources are allocated in particular ways and how decisions correspond to constitutionally legitimate objectives.

The comparison also reveals important differences in the role of constitutional adjudication. In Iraq, constitutional review is closely connected with disputes over federal structure and the allocation of competencies. In Algeria, constitutional review is more closely associated with controlling the legality and constitutionality of national legislative and executive action. The economic role of constitutional adjudication is nevertheless relevant in both contexts because judges may be required to consider whether fiscal legislation complies with principles of equality, legality, and the protection of public interests (Salman & Ibrahim, 2022). The ability of constitutional courts to influence legislation further demonstrates that judicial review can contribute to correcting legal frameworks that inadequately protect constitutional principles (Laibi, 2023). The challenge is to preserve a distinction between constitutional control and policy substitution. Courts should not determine the precise percentage of every budget allocation, but they should be able to invalidate measures that violate clear constitutional standards or result from an unlawful exercise of power.

The comparison between the two states further demonstrates that parliamentary oversight requires more than formal budget approval. Legislative institutions must have sufficient access to financial information, technical expertise, committee structures, and powers to question executive officials. Budget control is particularly important because the general budget is the principal mechanism through which resource revenues are distributed. The legislative role in the budget process provides a direct opportunity to evaluate the relationship between public expenditure and social priorities (Karim, 2022). At the same time, the constitutional regulation of public expenditure emphasizes that spending must remain subject to legal authorization and control (Abdul Qadir, 2018). Effective legislative oversight should therefore combine *ex ante* authorization with *ex post* review.

The protection of economic and social rights provides another comparative benchmark. In Iraq, constitutional recognition of social justice and economic rights connects public wealth directly with citizens' welfare (Al-Numan, 2020). Economic rights in constitutional systems provide a legal basis for evaluating whether public resources support basic social services and opportunities (Ghailan, 2014). In Algeria, the constitutional framework likewise places social and economic functions within the responsibilities of the state, while institutional mechanisms for distributive justice demonstrate the practical importance of fair allocation (Brahimi & Zenkri, 2024). In both systems, therefore, oversight should extend beyond the legality of financial transactions to the effectiveness of expenditure in achieving constitutionally legitimate social objectives.

A major weakness common to both states is the possibility that legal safeguards remain formal rather than operational. Constitutional provisions, parliamentary powers, and judicial jurisdiction can coexist with weak transparency, delayed reporting, political influence, or ineffective enforcement. The mere existence of an oversight body does not guarantee meaningful oversight. Institutional effectiveness requires independence, professional capacity, access to information, coordination among bodies, and the legal power to impose consequences. Similarly, transparency does not achieve accountability unless disclosed information can trigger investigation, parliamentary questioning, judicial review, or corrective administrative action. The central lesson of the comparison is therefore that legal safeguards must be evaluated functionally rather than formally.

Iraq's reform priorities should focus on resolving the legal uncertainty surrounding natural-resource governance, strengthening integrated financial reporting, establishing predictable revenue-sharing mechanisms, enhancing judicial enforceability, and reducing opportunities for political bargaining over constitutionally owned resources. The legal framework should clarify the responsibilities of federal, regional, and governorate authorities while preserving both national ownership and legitimate territorial interests. Greater institutional coordination would not require eliminating federal diversity; rather, it would establish common standards for transparency, auditing, and resource accounting. Algeria's priorities should focus on strengthening the independence and effectiveness of centralized oversight institutions, expanding access to financial information, ensuring robust constitutional scrutiny of economic measures, and deepening transparency in procurement and expenditure. Centralization can support coherent oversight only where independent institutions are capable of scrutinizing the central authorities themselves.

Both systems would benefit from stronger intergenerational safeguards. The exhaustion of natural resources makes it necessary to evaluate whether current fiscal policies preserve sufficient value for future citizens. Constitutional guarantees relating to future generations provide a basis for developing long-term savings and investment mechanisms (Jawad, 2021). Iraq's experience with the political consequences of oil wealth also demonstrates the risks associated with allowing resource revenues to become instruments of short-term governmental control (Al-Hiti, 2007). Algeria faces comparable structural concerns as a hydrocarbon-dependent state. In both countries, sovereign or stabilization funds can contribute to intergenerational equity only if their governance is transparent and insulated from discretionary withdrawals.

The most important comparative conclusion is that constitutional structure influences the form of oversight but does not determine its success. Federal Iraq requires mechanisms capable of coordinating plural institutions and preventing jurisdictional fragmentation from weakening accountability. Unitary Algeria requires mechanisms capable of preventing centralized authority from escaping effective scrutiny. In both systems, the same foundational principles remain essential: legality, transparency, separation of powers, judicial review, parliamentary financial control, protection of public funds, objective distribution criteria, and public accountability. Effective distributive oversight therefore depends less on whether authority is centralized or decentralized than on whether the constitutional system makes power visible, legally bounded, reviewable, and answerable for the use of national wealth.

5. Strengthening Legal Safeguards for Equitable Wealth Distribution

Enhancing the effectiveness of oversight requires moving from general constitutional recognition toward an integrated legal architecture capable of regulating the entire process through which national wealth is transformed into public benefits. The first requirement is legislative clarity. Constitutional provisions necessarily operate at a relatively general level, and their effective application depends on statutes and regulations that define institutional responsibilities, procedural obligations, reporting requirements, and remedies. This is especially important in Iraq, where the constitutional allocation of oil and gas powers has generated continuing disagreement. The legal literature concerning constitutional jurisdictions in the hydrocarbon sector demonstrates the complexity of determining the respective authority of federal and subnational institutions (Hussein, 2015). The conflict of jurisdiction identified in the relationship among the federal government, regions, and governorates similarly shows that constitutional principles require detailed legislative implementation (Abboud, 2007). A comprehensive oil and gas law should therefore be regarded as a foundational oversight safeguard because it could specify who may contract, how contracts are approved, where revenues are deposited, which bodies conduct audits, how information is disclosed, and how revenues are distributed.

Such legislation should reflect the constitutional principle that natural resources belong to the people rather than allocating excessive authority to a particular governmental level. The right of the Iraqi population to benefit from natural wealth requires that exploitation arrangements remain oriented toward collective welfare (Al-Yasiri, 2023). The constitutional right to natural resources likewise supports the view that the state exercises stewardship rather than absolute ownership (Al-Amidi, 2019). The law should consequently prohibit arrangements that allow public resources to be managed outside transparent fiscal channels or distributed in ways incompatible with national ownership. At the same time, it should recognize legitimate regional interests and the burdens imposed on producing areas. Objective allocation criteria could include population, development indicators, poverty, infrastructure deficits, environmental impacts, and the costs associated with production.

A second requirement is the institutionalization of transparent revenue-sharing formulas. Annual political bargaining creates uncertainty and allows distributive decisions to become instruments of political pressure. In federal systems, the allocation of financial competencies can generate recurring disputes unless the constitution is supported by predictable fiscal rules (Chailan, 2015). A statutory revenue-sharing framework would not eliminate political debate, but it would constrain that debate within objective parameters. Such a framework should specify the proportions or criteria used in intergovernmental transfers, procedures for revising the formula, mechanisms for resolving disputes, and publication obligations. It should also provide safeguards against unilateral withholding of constitutionally required transfers. The jurisdiction of regions and governorates concerning resources makes such predictability particularly important (Al-Tamimi, 2015).

A third requirement is the strengthening of parliamentary financial control. Legislatures should receive comprehensive and timely information concerning natural-resource revenues, budget transfers, public borrowing, off-budget funds, and the financial position of state-owned enterprises. Legislative competence over public finance provides the constitutional basis for this role ([Ghailan, 2009](#)), while the legislature's participation in the general budget enables it to scrutinize distributive priorities ([Karim, 2022](#)). Parliamentary committees should have access to technical experts and independent financial analysis so that scrutiny is not limited to partisan debate. Public hearings can further enhance accountability by requiring ministers and senior officials to explain allocation decisions. Where significant deviations occur between approved and executed expenditure, government should be required to provide formal justification.

The fourth requirement is stronger constitutional and judicial review. Judicial institutions should remain capable of reviewing laws and administrative measures that violate constitutional standards governing public wealth, equality, or institutional competence. The economic role of constitutional adjudication confirms that constitutional judges may legitimately review financial measures where they implicate constitutional principles ([Salman & Ibrahim, 2022](#)). In Iraq, the Federal Supreme Court's broader responsibility for constitutional protection provides an essential foundation for this function ([Habib, 2012](#)). Review of unconstitutional amendments also demonstrates the capacity of constitutional adjudication to defend basic constitutional structures against political alteration ([Kadhim, 2023](#)). Nevertheless, courts require clear legal standards if they are to distinguish legitimate economic discretion from unconstitutional distribution. Legislative precision therefore strengthens rather than displaces judicial oversight.

In Algeria, constitutional review should continue to function as a safeguard against legislative and executive measures that depart from constitutional requirements. Legal guarantees concerning the implementation of constitutional rules emphasize the importance of institutions capable of enforcing constitutional supremacy ([Belaaribi & Mouhou, 2017](#)). Review of legislative orders is especially important where executive authority influences the legislative process ([Ben Mehrou & Labiad, 2023](#)). The effectiveness of constitutional review could be enhanced by facilitating access to constitutional procedures, ensuring reasoned decisions, and strengthening implementation mechanisms. Economic and financial legislation should not be treated as categorically insulated from constitutional scrutiny merely because it involves complex policy choices.

A fifth requirement concerns transparency and access to financial information. Oversight institutions cannot operate effectively where essential data are unavailable. Iraq and Algeria should therefore adopt or strengthen mandatory disclosure requirements covering hydrocarbon revenues, production volumes, government contracts, licensing arrangements, budget execution, transfers between levels of government, public procurement, and sovereign or stabilization funds. Transparency in public procurement is particularly important because it helps protect public resources from favoritism and corruption ([Djellab & Maamri, 2021](#)). Publication should occur in standardized, machine-readable, and comprehensible forms so that information can be compared over time. Financial disclosure should also distinguish between approved allocations, actual transfers, contractual commitments, and final expenditure.

Transparency must be accompanied by accountability mechanisms. Disclosure becomes meaningful only if institutions can act on the information made public. Parliamentary committees should be able to summon officials, audit institutions should possess access to all relevant accounts, courts should be able to review unlawful decisions, and administrative bodies should be required to respond to identified irregularities. The constitutionalization of rights and freedoms demonstrates that formal recognition requires institutional enforcement ([Ahmed, 2024](#)). The same principle applies to transparency: publication without consequences may create the appearance of openness without materially constraining public power.

A sixth requirement is the strengthening of independent financial and administrative oversight. Public administration is governed by legal rules that establish competences and limit official discretion ([Abdullah, 2007](#)). Institutions responsible for auditing and financial control should therefore possess operational independence, adequate funding, professional staff, and legal authority to obtain documents. Their reports should be published and followed by mandatory governmental responses. Oversight should include performance auditing in addition to traditional legality auditing. A public expenditure may comply formally with budgetary authorization yet remain inefficient or ineffective. Performance review can determine whether spending actually achieves the social and developmental objectives used to justify it.

A seventh requirement is the rationalization of public expenditure. Equity in distribution cannot be achieved solely by increasing expenditure because inefficient spending may benefit contractors, administrative structures, or privileged groups without improving citizens' welfare. Public expenditure must be governed by legal standards and directed toward legitimate public purposes ([Abdul Qadir, 2018](#)). Budgetary priorities should therefore be linked to measurable development needs and social indicators. Regions suffering from inadequate infrastructure, unemployment, environmental damage, or weak public services may require additional resources, but these allocations should be based on published criteria. The distinction between equality and equity is important: equal nominal transfers may perpetuate inequality where starting conditions differ substantially.

An eighth requirement is the protection of intergenerational equity. Constitutional guarantees concerning future generations demonstrate that the management of exhaustible resources must consider those who cannot participate in current political decision-making ([Jawad, 2021](#)). Both Iraq and Algeria should therefore establish stronger legal mechanisms for saving or investing a portion of hydrocarbon revenues. Sovereign wealth funds can serve this purpose, but only where their governance prevents political manipulation. The law should define mandatory contribution rules, permissible withdrawals, investment standards, disclosure obligations, and independent auditing. Parliament should receive periodic reports, and deviations from statutory rules should be subject to judicial or institutional review.

The historical political effects of oil wealth reinforce the need for such safeguards. Iraqi analysis has emphasized that oil revenues may strengthen political domination when concentrated in the hands of the state without sufficient accountability ([Al-Hiti, 2007](#)). Diversifying the economy and investing resource revenues in productive assets can reduce dependence on volatile hydrocarbon income and strengthen the relationship between public finance and long-term development. Equity therefore requires not only distributing current revenues but transforming exhaustible natural wealth into durable economic and social capital.

A ninth requirement is the protection of economic and social rights through budgetary policy. Economic rights recognized in constitutional systems become meaningful when public resources are directed toward health, education, housing, social protection, and employment opportunities ([Ghailan, 2014](#)). In Iraq, constitutional social justice commitments provide a normative basis for evaluating whether resource wealth contributes to dignified living conditions ([Al-Numan, 2020](#)). Distribution should therefore be assessed not only geographically but functionally. A system may distribute funds relatively evenly among governorates while allocating too little to essential public services. Budget oversight should examine whether expenditure patterns advance constitutional social objectives.

A tenth requirement is the development of stronger standards for public contracting and exploitation of natural resources. The people's right to benefit from national wealth can be undermined where contractual arrangements transfer excessive economic advantages to private actors or where contracts are negotiated without transparency ([Al-Yasiri, 2023](#)). Legal safeguards should require competitive procedures where appropriate, disclosure of significant contractual terms, legislative or independent review of major resource agreements, conflict-of-interest rules, and strong audit rights. Contracts should also address environmental restoration, local development obligations, and penalties for noncompliance. The protection of collective resource interests should be treated with the same seriousness that constitutional law accords to legally protected property interests ([Al-Sarraf, 2010](#)).

An eleventh requirement is the strengthening of distributive accountability in Algeria through transparent institutional procedures. Algerian research on distributive justice demonstrates that fairness depends on clear mechanisms for collection, allocation, and oversight ([Brahimi & Zenkri, 2024](#)). This principle should be extended to broader national fiscal policy. Regional development allocations should be based on published socio-economic indicators and periodically evaluated. The criteria used to classify priority areas should be transparent, and beneficiaries should have mechanisms for challenging administrative errors or discriminatory treatment. Centralization can facilitate coherent policy only where central institutions provide sufficient justification for distributive choices.

A twelfth requirement is the integration of transparency into all forms of public procurement and economic intervention. Algerian legal experience demonstrates the importance of transparency as a safeguard in procurement ([Djellab & Maamri, 2021](#)). This principle should include publication of tender notices, evaluation criteria, successful bids, contractual values,

amendments, implementation progress, and final payments. Comparable safeguards should be strengthened in Iraq. Procurement transparency is particularly relevant in resource-rich states because large capital budgets create substantial opportunities for corruption and rent seeking. Preventing losses in procurement is itself a form of distributive justice because every amount diverted through corruption represents resources unavailable for public services or investment.

A thirteenth requirement is stronger cooperation among oversight institutions. Constitutional courts, ordinary courts, parliaments, audit bodies, anti-corruption agencies, procurement authorities, and executive financial institutions often possess overlapping responsibilities. Fragmentation can lead to gaps where each institution assumes that another body is responsible. Formal protocols for information sharing, referral, and coordinated investigation can reduce this problem. This is particularly important in Iraq because the federal structure already multiplies institutional levels. Coordination should not compromise independence; rather, it should ensure that findings of financial irregularity are transmitted to institutions capable of imposing legal consequences.

A fourteenth requirement is enhancing public participation and social oversight. Although formal state institutions remain central, citizens and civil society contribute to accountability by examining budgets, monitoring projects, reporting corruption, and evaluating service delivery. Transparency enables this participation, while legal protection ensures that public criticism does not expose participants to retaliation. The constitutionalization of public freedoms provides an important legal foundation for meaningful civic participation (Ahmed, 2024). Independent media can similarly help transform financial information into accessible public knowledge. Social oversight is particularly valuable where formal institutions are politically constrained or technically limited.

Finally, effective oversight should be evaluated through outcomes. The existence of laws, courts, and reports is insufficient if regional inequality persists, public services remain inadequate, or resource revenues fail to generate sustainable development. Oversight mechanisms should therefore incorporate indicators relating to poverty, infrastructure, health, education, employment, and regional development. Such indicators do not replace legal analysis but help determine whether the constitutional purpose of equitable wealth distribution is actually being achieved. A modern legal framework should connect procedural legality with substantive public results while preserving the distinction between judicial review and policy evaluation. The objective is not to constitutionalize every economic choice but to ensure that the management of national wealth remains transparent, accountable, rational, and directed toward the public interest.

6. Conclusion

Equity in wealth distribution is not merely an economic aspiration but a constitutional principle that determines the relationship between national resources, public authority, and the rights of citizens. In resource-rich states such as Iraq and Algeria, this principle assumes particular importance because natural-resource revenues constitute a major component of public finance and therefore shape the state's capacity to provide services, reduce social disparities, promote balanced development, and protect future generations. The constitutional recognition of public wealth, social justice, and economic rights establishes an important normative foundation, but constitutional provisions cannot produce distributive justice automatically. Their effectiveness depends on a legal and institutional system capable of supervising how resources are extracted, collected, allocated, spent, and preserved.

The comparison between Iraq and Algeria demonstrates that constitutional structure significantly influences the organization of oversight. Iraq's federal system creates a plural and decentralized framework in which the federal government, regions, governorates, Parliament, courts, and other oversight institutions interact in the management of public resources. This structure can accommodate territorial diversity and enable local participation, but it also creates serious risks of jurisdictional overlap, fragmented accountability, inconsistent financial reporting, and political disputes over revenue. The continuing ambiguity surrounding important aspects of oil and gas management illustrates the broader difficulty of implementing distributive justice when constitutional principles are not supported by sufficiently clear legislation. The most important challenge for Iraq is therefore not the absence of constitutional commitment to public ownership or equity, but the incomplete translation of those commitments into integrated and enforceable mechanisms.

Algeria's unitary system presents a different institutional pattern. Greater centralization allows public finance and resource management to be regulated through more unified national institutions. This may reduce certain types of jurisdictional conflict and facilitate consistent administrative procedures. At the same time, however, concentration of authority can weaken distributive accountability if central institutions are insufficiently transparent or if oversight bodies lack meaningful

independence. Algeria's effectiveness therefore depends on ensuring that centralized resource management remains subject to constitutional review, parliamentary scrutiny, administrative accountability, procurement transparency, and public access to financial information. A unitary structure can support coherent wealth distribution only where centralized decision-making is itself effectively supervised.

The study demonstrates that neither federalism nor centralization automatically produces equitable outcomes. The decisive factor is whether institutional authority is legally defined, publicly visible, subject to independent review, and connected to enforceable responsibility. Effective oversight requires a combination of constitutional supremacy, the rule of law, separation of powers, judicial review, parliamentary control, independent financial auditing, transparent procurement, and public accountability. These mechanisms are mutually reinforcing. Constitutional review is weakened when legislation is ambiguous; parliamentary oversight is weakened when financial information is unavailable; transparency is ineffective when disclosed irregularities produce no consequences; and auditing is insufficient when institutions cannot enforce corrective measures.

For Iraq, the enactment of a comprehensive and coherent legal framework governing hydrocarbons should be treated as a central reform priority. Such legislation should clarify the powers of the federal government, regions, and governorates while preserving the constitutional principle that national resources belong to the population as a whole. It should regulate contracting, production reporting, revenue collection, auditing, allocation, intergovernmental transfers, and disclosure. Revenue-sharing mechanisms should be based on objective and predictable criteria rather than recurring political negotiation. Population size, developmental need, production-related burdens, environmental costs, infrastructure deficits, and regional disparities can provide rational foundations for differentiated allocations. Clear statutory formulas would strengthen both equity and political stability by reducing the possibility that national wealth is used as an instrument of intergovernmental pressure.

For Algeria, reform should focus on ensuring that centralization is accompanied by strong institutional accountability. Constitutional and administrative oversight bodies should possess sufficient independence, expertise, and access to information to examine economic and financial decisions. Public procurement rules should be implemented through extensive disclosure and effective review, while regional development policies should be based on transparent indicators. Constitutional review should remain available where financial or economic legislation conflicts with constitutional principles. The effectiveness of oversight should be assessed not merely by the number of institutions or reports produced but by the ability of those institutions to detect irregularities, impose consequences, and improve public-resource management.

In both countries, parliamentary control over the budget requires substantial strengthening. Legislatures should receive comprehensive information concerning resource revenues, public borrowing, transfers, procurement, and the financial operations of state enterprises. Parliamentary scrutiny should continue throughout the budget cycle rather than ending when appropriations are approved. Governments should be required to explain substantial deviations between authorized and actual expenditure, and financial committees should have sufficient technical capacity to assess complex resource and fiscal data. Parliamentary accountability is particularly important because the general budget is the principal legal mechanism through which national wealth is converted into social and developmental benefits.

Transparency should become a general legal principle governing all stages of resource management. Public authorities should disclose production volumes, resource revenues, significant contracts, transfers, budget execution, public procurement, and the management of sovereign or stabilization funds. Information should be timely, comparable, detailed, and accessible to citizens rather than confined to technical reports that cannot be meaningfully evaluated. Transparency must also be connected with enforceable accountability. Audit findings should produce formal governmental responses, serious irregularities should be referred to competent investigative or judicial institutions, and officials responsible for unlawful or wasteful financial decisions should face appropriate legal consequences.

Judicial and constitutional oversight should be strengthened without converting courts into economic policymakers. Courts should not determine every fiscal priority or substitute their preferences for those of elected institutions. They should, however, ensure that public authorities remain within constitutional and statutory limits, respect the distribution of competences, comply with mandatory procedures, and avoid arbitrary discrimination. Judicial review is particularly necessary where resource disputes involve questions of public ownership, equality, institutional competence, or the misuse of public authority. The effectiveness of judicial oversight depends on institutional independence, clear jurisdiction, timely procedures, reasoned decisions, and faithful implementation of judgments.

Intergenerational justice should become a more explicit component of natural-resource governance in both Iraq and Algeria. Oil and gas are exhaustible national assets, and a distribution system focused entirely on present expenditure cannot be considered fully equitable. Part of the economic value generated by current extraction should be transformed into assets capable of benefiting future citizens. Sovereign wealth funds, stabilization mechanisms, long-term infrastructure investment, human-capital development, and economic diversification can contribute to this objective if they are governed by transparent and legally enforceable rules. Intergenerational justice also requires caution regarding unsustainable public borrowing and fiscal commitments that transfer costs to future populations.

The principle of equity further requires that distribution be evaluated in substantive rather than purely formal terms. Equal financial transfers do not necessarily produce equitable outcomes where territories differ significantly in population, poverty, infrastructure, environmental burdens, or access to public services. Objective differentiation may therefore be necessary to achieve genuine equality. At the same time, differentiated allocations must be justified through transparent criteria rather than political favoritism. The legitimacy of distributive decisions depends on whether citizens can understand the basis upon which resources are allocated and whether those criteria are applied consistently.

Effective oversight should also extend beyond the initial allocation of revenues to the final use of public funds. A region may receive an appropriate share of national wealth yet fail to translate that allocation into public welfare because of corruption, administrative inefficiency, poor procurement, or weak project implementation. Oversight should therefore follow public resources throughout the entire expenditure chain. Performance auditing, project monitoring, procurement transparency, and evaluation of social outcomes should supplement traditional accounting controls. The constitutional objective of equitable wealth distribution is ultimately realized not when money is transferred between governmental accounts but when national resources contribute to improved living conditions, social security, education, health, infrastructure, employment, and sustainable development.

Civil society and the media also have an important role in transforming formal transparency into meaningful public accountability. Citizens should be able to examine financial information, monitor public projects, report irregularities, and participate in public debate concerning distributive priorities. Public authorities should therefore provide information in accessible formats and protect lawful participation in oversight activities. Social accountability does not replace institutional control but reinforces it by increasing the number of actors capable of identifying discrepancies between legal commitments and administrative practice.

The comparative analysis ultimately shows that the legal protection of equitable wealth distribution requires a shift from constitutional proclamation toward institutionalized accountability. Iraq and Algeria already possess legal foundations capable of supporting distributive justice, but the effectiveness of those foundations depends on clarity, enforcement, transparency, independence, and coordination. Iraq must overcome fragmentation without undermining federalism, while Algeria must strengthen accountability without sacrificing administrative coherence. Both systems must ensure that natural resources are treated not as discretionary governmental assets but as public wealth held and managed for society.

The most sustainable approach is therefore one in which constitutional principles, legislation, fiscal institutions, courts, parliaments, auditors, and public participation operate as parts of a unified system of distributive accountability. Such a system should protect current citizens against arbitrary or unequal resource allocation, protect producing and disadvantaged territories through objective criteria, protect public funds against waste and corruption, and protect future generations against the depletion of national wealth. When these safeguards operate effectively, oversight becomes more than a procedural requirement: it becomes the mechanism through which constitutional commitments to social justice, equality, public ownership, and sustainable development are converted into actual distributive outcomes.

Ethical Considerations

All procedures performed in this study were under the ethical standards.

Acknowledgments

Authors thank all who helped us through this study.

Conflict of Interest

The authors report no conflict of interest.

Funding/Financial Support

According to the authors, this article has no financial support.

References

- Abboud, I. A. (2007). *The Distribution and Conflict of Jurisdiction in the Investment of Oil and Gas between the Federal Government, Regions, and Governorates in Iraq* [Master's thesis, Al-Nahrain University].
- Abdul Hamza, A. S. (2008). *The Legal Regulation of Allowances Granted to Employees* [Master's thesis, Al-Nahrain University]. Baghdad.
- Abdul Qadir, B. S. (2018). The Components of Public Expenditure. *Journal of Legal Sciences*.
- Abdullah, A. G. B. (2007). *The Comprehensive Guide to Administrative Law* (1 ed.). Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya for Publishing and Distribution.
- Ahmed, M. J. (2024). Authority and Constitutionalization of Public Freedoms in Democratic Systems. *International Studies Journal*(97).
- Akla, A. J. M. (2023). *The Impact of the Nature of the Political System on Constitutional Review in Iraq: A Comparative Study*. Arab Democratic Center for Strategic, Political and Economic Studies.
- Al-Amidi, M. M. K. (2019). The Right to Natural Resources. *Journal of the University of Babylon for Humanities*, 27(2).
- Al-Hiti, M. (2007). *Iraq's Oil Wealth: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to a Potential Foundation for Democracy in Oil, Political and Economic Despotism of the Rentier State*. Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Al-Masawi, M. (2017). *Constitutional Law and Political Systems: Part One, An Introduction to the General Theory of Constitutional Law*.
- Al-Numan, S. (2020). The Iraqi Constitution and Social Justice. *Iraqi Forums for Elites and Competencies*.
- Al-Sarraf, A. F. (2010). *Constitutional and Legal Protection of the Right to Private Property: A Comparative Study*. Dar Zahran for Publishing and Distribution.
- Al-Tamimi, I. A. A. (2015). *The Jurisdiction of Regions and Governorates Not Organized into a Region Concerning Oil and Gas* Al-Nahrain University].
- Al-Yasiri, M. R. M. (2023). The Right of the Iraqi People to Exploit Their Natural Wealth and the Impact of Oil Contracts Thereon. *Journal of the Iraqi University*, 2(59).
- Belaaribi, S., & Mouhou, A. (2017). *Legal Guarantees for the Implementation of Constitutional Rules in Algeria* [Master's thesis, Akli Mohand Oulhadj University].
- Ben Mehoul, T., & Labiad, L. (2023). The Reality of Constitutional Review of Legislative Orders in Algeria. *Legal and Social Sciences*(9).
- Brahimi, A., & Zenkri, M. (2024). Achieving Distributive Justice within the Framework of Benefiting from Zakat Institutions. *Journal of Research and Development Studies*, 11(2).
- Djellab, F., & Maamri, M. (2021). *Guarantees of the Principle of Transparency in the Regulation of Public Procurement under Algerian Legislation* [Master's thesis, Larbi Tebessi University]. Tebessa, Algeria.
- Ghailan, O. S. (2009). The Legislative Competence of Parliament in Financial Affairs. *Journal of Legislation and Economics*(1).
- Ghailan, O. S. (2014). Economic Rights in the Iraqi and Comparative Constitutions. *Journal of Comparative Law*(15).
- Ghailan, O. S. (2015). Financial Competencies in Federal Systems. *Journal of Legislation and Judiciary*(1).
- Habib, A. D. M. (2012). *The Role of the Iraqi Constitutional Judiciary in Protecting Rights and Freedoms: A Comparative Study* [Master's thesis, University of Tikrit].
- Hussein, M. S. (2015). *Constitutional Jurisdictions Relating to Oil and Gas under the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq of 2005* [Master's thesis, University of Baghdad].
- Jawad, H. R. J. (2021). *Constitutional Guarantees of the Rights of Future Generations* [Master's thesis, University of Diyala].
- Kadhim, M. S. (2023). *The Review of the Federal Supreme Court of Unconstitutional Amendments under the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq of 2005* [Master's thesis, University of Al-Qadisiyah].
- Karim, R. B. (2022). *The Role of the Legislator in the General State Budget Stage* [Master's thesis, Islamic University in Lebanon].
- Khalil, R. (2008). Constitutional Guarantees of Human Rights. *Diyala Journal*(28).
- Laibi, M. A. (2023). *The Role of Constitutional Adjudication in Amending Legislation: A Comparative Study* [Master's thesis, Al-Mustansiriyah University].
- Omar, S. H. (2018). *Characteristics of the Federal System: A Comparative Analytical Study*. Arab Center for Publishing and Distribution.
- Salman, F. H., & Ibrahim, A. A. (2022). The Economic Role of the Constitutional Judge. *Al-Mahd Journal*(9).